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 PREFACE 
 
 This special issue of the Parker School Journal on East European Law is devoted to an 
important topic which has been overlooked in the process of transformation undergone by the 
legal systems of Central and Eastern Europe in the last decade.  Collected in this issue are papers 
presented at an Experts Meeting held in Oxford, England, April 2-4, 1998, on Access to Legal 
Aid for Indigent Criminal Defendants. 
 
 The meeting was organized by the Project on Access to Justice in Central and Eastern 
Europe, a joint initiative of three organizations: Columbia Law School‟s Public Interest Law 
Initiative in Transitional Societies, the London-based Interights and the Budapest-based 
European Roma Rights Center.  The Ford Foundation and the Open Society Institute‟s 
Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute (COLPI), based in Budapest, provided financial 
support. In addition, COLPI contributed to the substance of the meeting through its research arm, 
and it has joined the efforts of the Project on Access to Justice in Central and Eastern Europe to 
plan follow-up activities. 
 
 This issue of the Parker School Journal of Eastern European Law includes papers 
discussing the current situation with respect to legal aid to indigent criminal defendants in five 
countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania.  In addition, there is a 
comparative survey synthesizing these papers prepared by Károly Bárd, the Research Director of 
the Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute.  A paper by Marek Antoni Nowicki, a member of 
the European Commission of Human Rights, outlines the jurisprudence of European Convention 
on Human Rights on the right to legal assistance in criminal proceeding.  Finally, Jeremy 
McBride, a lecturer at the University of Birmingham, provides an overview of obstacles to 
access to justice more broadly, relying on European Convention jurisprudence. 
 
 The papers contained in this special issue identify many shortcomings in the provision of 
legal assistance to those who cannot afford to hire a lawyer in criminal cases.  Generally, the fee 
structures and budgets of the ex officio mandatory legal defense systems that predominate in the 
region are inadequate, and the quality of legal assistance provided is seriously flawed.  
Moreover, current legal frameworks in the region generally provide for legal aid only for the 
most serious criminal cases, providing either discretionary guarantees or no guarantee at all in 
other criminal matters which result in the loss of personal liberty.  These deficiencies arguably 
violate the guarantees contained in Article 6(3)(c) of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
which states that everyone charged with a criminal offense has the right “to defend himself in 
person through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for 
legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require.” 
 
 Legal assistance in civil proceedings was not the subject of the Expert Meeting and the 
papers associated with it, but the need for adequate legal aid in the interest of access to justice 
clearly goes beyond criminal proceedings alone. 
 
 The effort to bring attention to access to justice issues in Central and Eastern Europe falls 
squarely within the mandate of the organizers‟ institutions.  The Public Interest Law Initiative 
assists the development and facilitates the networking of public interest law communities in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia.  Interights is an international 
human rights center which provides legal advice, assistance and information on human rights 
cases.  The European Roma Rights Center is an international public interest law organization 
which monitors the situation of Roma in Europe and provides legal defense in cases of human 
rights abuse.  The Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute contributes to the development of 
open societies in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
through legal reform and support of basic rights and modern democratic institutions. 
 
 The papers contained in this special issue of the Journal of Eastern European Law 
represent a first attempt to define the parameters of an important topic which deserves further 
study.  The Project on Access to Justice in Central and Eastern Europe intends to facilitate such 
efforts and to continue bringing attention to the need for better means of providing legal aid to 
the socially disadvantaged. 
 
New York 
December 1998 
 
Edwin Rekosh    James Goldston 
Public Interest Law Initiative  European Roma Rights Center 
Columbia Law School 
 
Borislav Petranov   Ina Zoon 
European Roma Rights Center Interights 
 
  
Country Report: Hungary 
 
K ROLY B RD* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE  
 
General Background 
 
In Hungary, the administration of justice more or less follows the European pattern.  This 
includes the court system and other agencies operating within the judicial system.  However, 
some institutions still show the impact of the communist regime.  The majority of the population 
(10.17 million, in total) lives in urban areas.  About 62.8 % of the population lives in the capital 
and other cities.  The differences between a city and a village are not always considerable.  It is 
the difference between the capital, Budapest, and the rest of the country which is significant.  
This is also reflected by the fact that out of the approximately 8,000 attorneys in Hungary, 3,800 
practice law in Budapest.   
 
The Court System After the 1997 Reform 
 
In 1997, there were significant changes in the organization and the structure of the court 
system.   Parliament decided to replace the three level court system (local courts, county courts, 
Supreme Court) by a four tier system which prevailed in Hungary before the Second World 
War.296  
 
The competence of the different courts in criminal cases has not yet been finalized, 
because the draft for a new Code of Criminal Procedure is still being debated in Parliament.297  
According to the draft, the so called local courts (the lowest courts) would act as first instance 
courts with general competence.  More serious cases specified in the law would be decided in the 
first instance by the so called county courts, which would also act as second instance courts in 
cases when the local courts‟ decisions are appealed.  The newly established appellate courts 
would proceed as second instance courts in cases when the county courts‟ first instance 
judgments are appealed.  They would also act as third instance courts, a more or less second 
appeals court which reviews only legal issues, in cases originating in local courts.  
 
The Supreme Court would act as a third instance court presiding over the more serious 
cases which originated in the county courts.  This is the highest judicial body in the nation.  It is 
envisaged to look to various institutions in order to provide for the uniform application of law as 
well as remedy the gravest errors found in final decisions. 
 
                                                          
* Research Director, Constitutional and Legislative Policy Institute (COLPI), Budapest 
296 See Act  LXVI of 1997 on the Organization and the Administration of the Courts. 
297 It has been enacted in the meantime. 
The new Law on the Organization and Administration of the Courts is also significant in 
that it guarantees judicial independence.  The new law established the so called National Judicial 
Council (NJC), which has taken over functions previously exercised by the Minister of Justice.  
This body  is made up of nine judges elected by the assembly of judges, the Minister of Justice, 
the prosecutor general, the chairperson of the National Chamber of Attorneys and two members 
of Parliament nominated by the Constitutional and Justice Committee and the Committee for 
Financial and Budgetary Affairs, respectively.  The council is headed by the President of the 
Supreme Court. 
 
The execution of all the tasks related to the administration of the courts is the 
responsibility of the NJC.  This includes control over the administrative activity of the presidents 
of the courts, preparation of the draft budget for the court system and organizing the training of 
judges.  The NJC also nominates a candidate for the position of President of the Supreme Court, 
appoints the presidents of the appellate and the county courts, and performs a number of other 
tasks related to personnel policy.  
 
It is the task of the Hungarian Supreme Court to guide the activity of the courts and to 
assure the uniform application of the laws.  The Supreme Court, in some cases acting as an 
appellate court, under exceptional conditions reviews final judgments and passes resolutions 
explicitly aimed at the uniform application of legal provisions in matters of principle.  Whereas 
the uniformity of the administration of justice is guaranteed by the Supreme Court, the 
homogeneity of the legal system and its compliance with the Constitution is supervised by the 
Constitutional Court, which has distinguished itself among similar bodies in the region by its 
activism.  
    
The Prosecuting Agency 
 
The public prosecution agency in Hungary is independent of the executive.  The 
Prosecutor General is elected by Parliament for a term of six years and is responsible to the 
legislature.  The primary function of the organization is prosecution. This involves the 
supervision of police activity during investigations and bringing and representing charges before 
the courts.  The investigation of certain criminal offenses (such as violence against an official, 
duress used by the police during interrogation, brutality in official proceedings, and criminal 
offenses against the administration of justice such as perjury or false accusation) is in the 
exclusive competence of the prosecutor‟s office. In other words, the police have no power to 
investigate in these cases. 
 
It is the prosecution agency which oversees the lawful execution of prison sentences and 
enforces the respect of the rights of the individuals detained on any ground.  According to 
§10.2.b of the Law on the Prosecutor‟s Office of the Republic of Hungary,298 the prosecutor‟s 
office has some additional functions outside the criminal justice system.  For instance, the 
prosecutor may initiate a civil suit if the person concerned is unable to enforce his claim. 
 
The prosecutor‟s office is a hierarchical organization headed by the Prosecutor General.  
Prosecutors may be given instructions exclusively by the Prosecutor General and his 
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subordinates.  The Hungarian prosecution agency is bound by the principle of legality.  As a 
general rule, prosecutors may not take expediency into account in decisions on investigating and 
bringing cases before the courts.  However, for juveniles the prosecutor may postpone the filing 
of an indictment and prescribe certain rules of conduct for the defendant.  If the juvenile 
succeeds in observing the rules during the “probation period," the prosecutor‟s decision not to 
bring the case before the court becomes final.  A similar provision is envisaged in the draft to the 
new CCP for adults.  
 
The Bar 
 
Attorneys (advocates) are private lawyers who do their job either individually or as 
members of an attorney‟s office.  Any Hungarian national with a clean record is entitled to be 
admitted to the bar provided she/he graduated from a law school, passed the qualification 
examination after at least two years practicing as an attorney trainee, establishes permanent 
residence in Hungary and disposes of an adequate premise for office.  
 
Attorneys are members of an attorneys‟ chamber, which are organized on the county level, with 
one in the capital.  The chambers are the self-governing bodies of  attorneys which protect their 
own interests and rights.  Several organs of the chambers decide on admittance to and exclusion 
from the chamber, determine the chambers‟ budget and account for its use, act as disciplinary 
bodies, provide for the training of attorneys, decide on the appropriateness of the premises 
serving as the attorneys‟ office, and perform several other functions.  The National Chamber of 
Attorneys decides on appeals submitted against decisions of the individual chambers; reviews the 
lawfulness of the chambers‟ activity in general; and is the body authorized to form and express 
the opinion of the attorneys on legislation, draft legislation or on any issue related to the 
administration of justice and to submit it to the relevant bodies.  
  
Case load - Defendants in Custody  
 
The criminal justice system in Hungary faces the same problems as criminal justice 
systems in the rest of Europe.  Courts are overburdened and delays are considerable.  The annual 
number of first instance court proceedings in which the public prosecutor‟s office participates is 
around 95,000.  This breaks down into 91,893 before local courts, 1,476 before county courts, 
and 1,908 proceedings before military tribunals in 1996.  In the same year county courts heard 
appeals from 16,133 cases.  There were about 9,000 private prosecution cases, in which the 
injured party, not the public prosecutor agency acts as prosecutor.  These were cases of minor 
gravity, such as slander, defamation, light bodily injury, etc.  The overwhelming majority of 
these cases were settled, or the private accuser failed to appear at the trial.  
 
About 10% of those sentenced await trial and verdict in pretrial detention.  This applies to 
juveniles as well (7,217 and 696 out of the 74,653 convicted adult defendants and the 7,769 
juvenile defendants respectively were kept in pretrial detention in 1996.) 
 
         
II. OUTLINE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL LAW 
 
The Commencement of the Criminal Process, the Arrest of the Suspect, and the Phase of 
Investigation  
 
Criminal procedure in Hungary, as in many civil law countries, starts with a formal 
decision issued by the police on the commencement of criminal prosecution. Criminal 
prosecution can be based on a reasonable suspicion that a criminal offense has taken place.299  
In the event of urgency, a formal decision is not required.  Any procedural act of the police, such 
as search or inspection on the scene of the crime will introduce the criminal process, although a 
formal decision has to be passed afterwards.  
 
The commencement of the criminal procedure (procedure in rem) and the involvement of 
the individual suspect (procedure in personam) do not necessarily coincide.  This means that the 
formal rules laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure apply even if there is no individual to 
be suspected of having committed the criminal offense.  Furthermore, the deadline prescribed by 
the law for the accomplishment of the investigation starts on the date of the formal decision on 
the commencement of the criminal process, irrespective of the existence of an individual 
suspect.300  
 
An individual may be prosecuted if there is a well founded suspicion that he committed 
the criminal offense.  At this point he is the object of the suspicion and may make use of the 
rights provided for suspects by the code of criminal procedure.  In other words, that is the 
moment when he may make use of the services of a defense lawyer among exercising other 
rights.  This is what the constitutional provision, according to which defendants are entitled to 
the assistance of a lawyer in each stage of the proceedings, provides.301 
 
A person suspected of a criminal offense is not necessarily arrested.  The majority of 
suspects remain free  during the investigation and the trial.  After the communication of the 
suspicion, which is limited to a brief description of the facts making up the allegation and 
information on the relevant sections of the criminal code (thus evidence supporting the allegation 
need not to be communicated), the suspect has to be informed of his rights.  This includes the 
right to appoint a lawyer or to ask for a lawyer‟s appointment by the investigating authority.  If 
the defense is mandatory, the investigating authority has to inform the suspect that if he fails to 
appoint a lawyer within three days, appointment will be made ex officio.  
 
The interrogation of the suspect normally takes place immediately after the communication 
of suspicion.  The law requires that it take place within 24 hours of the communication.  Prior 
to and after the communication, the investigating authority will take the necessary measures 
for securing evidence (hearing witnesses, appointing experts, etc.).  Both the suspect and his 
defense lawyer can be present at the experts‟ hearing, at the inspection of the scene of the 
crime, and at some other procedural acts.  The defense lawyer also has the right to be present 
at the interrogation of the witnesses during the investigation. 
                                                          
299 The Hungarian Code of Criminal Procedure, Act I of 1973 (CCP), uses the term “well founded suspicion.” 
300 According to section 131 para. 2  investigation has to be completed within two months. However, this period 
may be extended; after six months it is the general prosecutor of the Republic who may extend the period of 
investigation. 
301  Section 57 Para. 3 of the Constitution. 
 The alleged offender may be arrested by the police if he was apprehended in the course of 
committing the offense and his identity may not be established or if there are grounds for 
pretrial detention (see below).  Arrest may be authorized either by the police or the 
prosecutor.  In practice it is ordered by the former.  Arrest is frequently ordered on the basis 
of urgency, i.e. the formal decision on introducing criminal procedure is taken afterwards 
(see above).  
 
Without a judicial decision, the suspect may be held in custody for a maximum of 72 
hours.  He is either released during this period or the prosecutor has to make a motion to the 
judge for ordering the suspect‟s pretrial detention.  The motion has to be submitted in time so as 
to enable the judge to make a decision  within 72 hours of the suspect‟s initial detention.  
 
Contact with the Defense Counsel 
 
According to the law, defense is mandatory when  the individual is detained.  This 
applies not only to pretrial detention but also when  a new procedure is introduced against 
someone serving his prison sentence or if the individual is detained for mental illness.   However, 
arrest does not make defense mandatory.  This is due to the already cited provision of the 
Constitution and the CPP, which declares that everyone is entitled to a defense lawyer from the 
commencement of the criminal process.  These provisions, in principle, do not prevent the 
individual from contacting his lawyer.  The suspicion has to be communicated to the detained 
persons and they have to be interrogated within 24 hours of their detention.  The defense lawyers 
may be present at the interrogation.  
 
In practice, detained persons are seriously disadvantaged.  As indicated by the report of 
the Ombudsman and the jail monitoring program carried out by the Constitutional and 
Legislative Policy Institute (COLPI) and the Hungarian Helsinki Committee,  it is extremely 
difficult to retain a lawyer while in jail.  In some regions, a request for representation is simply 
rejected by the prison administration or is forwarded to the investigator of the case. Further, 
making phone calls from jail is impossible.  The detainee‟s relatives may notify a lawyer and ask 
him contact the suspect.  Even if a lawyer is contacted, he encounters extreme difficulties 
entering the jail.  As reported in the summary of the jail monitoring project, “the officers want to 
see the authorization given by the detainee to the lawyer but to give such an authorization to an 
attorney is hardly possible without first meeting personally.” One should add that authorization 
may be given by the relatives as well. In addition, “ jail guards would like to limit the visits of 
lawyers to „office hours „, and if an attorney visits his client at a different time, the guards are not 
very obliging.”    
 
Detainees in need of ex officio appointed lawyers face additional challenges.  As stated 
above, the authorities are not obliged to appoint a lawyer until three days have passed since the 
communication of the suspicion.  Since normally the communication of the suspicion is followed 
immediately by the suspect‟s interrogation, the ex officio appointed lawyer is not usually present 
at the suspect‟s first interrogation.  However, even defendants at liberty represented by lawyers 
of their own choice have difficulties in having their lawyers present at the interrogation.  In spite 
of the already cited provisions, suspects are only informed of their right to counsel immediately 
before their interrogation.  In theory at least, defendants may insist on the presence of their 
lawyer at their interrogation. 
 
The law provides that lawyers and their clients may confer in private, without the 
presence of the representative of any state agency.  According to §97.1 of the CCP, pretrial 
detainees may not be hindered in exercising their right to defense.  According to para. 2 of the 
same section, “oral and written communication between pretrial detainees and their relatives and 
other persons is to be controlled by the proceeding agency.”  However, this provision does not 
apply to communication between the detainees and their lawyers.  Nevertheless, the report of the 
Ombudsman revealed a number of practices by which detainees were hindered in communicating 
freely with their attorneys.  In several regions special “contact rooms” were set up where the 
conditions of uninhibited communication were not guaranteed.  In some places, communications 
between the attorney and his client were restricted to “office hours” (between 8 am and 3.30 pm), 
which were interrupted by the staff‟s lunch time.  There are also jails where communication with 
the lawyer is only permitted after consultation with the officer in charge of the investigation of 
the particular case.  However, in other places conditions permit only oral communication, as the 
gates between the lawyer and the client prevent them to study the files together, for example.  
According to the report of the Ombudsman, these shortcomings violate the rule of law principle 
and the right to defense, both guaranteed in the Constitution.    
 
The Defendant’s Right to Choose his Defense Counsel; the Defense Counsel’s Presence in the 
Procedure 
 
The right of the accused to choose or to change his officially appointed lawyer is not 
secured under Hungarian law.  However, the accused has the general right to make motions and 
he may indicate the person he wishes to act as lawyer on his behalf.  To accept his motion is the 
discretion of the police, the prosecutor, or the court (depending on the stage of the process at 
which the appointment takes place).  On the other hand, the appointed defense lawyer may also 
ask the proceeding agency to relieve him of the obligation of acting on behalf of the accused.  
 
The new Code of Criminal Procedure envisages changes in this respect, which will only 
modestly improve the position of the accused.  The new rule is confined to an explicit 
declaration of the right of the accused to ask for the appointment of another defense attorney, 
without obliging the proceeding authorities to satisfy the request of the accused.  
 
As indicated above, the defense attorney has the right to be present at certain procedural 
acts during the investigation.  This rule applies to the court hearings over the issue of ordering 
pretrial detention.  According to section 379A(2), the defense lawyer has to be notified of the 
hearing. If he fails to appear, the hearing may be held in his absence.  The defense attorney is not 
obligated to attend all such acts, even when mandatory defense is involved. 
 
The general rule has not been applied to juveniles since September 1, 1995.302 When a 
juvenile is prosecuted, the defense attorney has to be present at all the hearings (section 302A).  
In this respect, it is worth mentioning that the amendment to the CCP adopted by Parliament in 
1995 significantly improved the guarantees protecting juvenile defendants.  The amendment 
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obliges the proceeding authorities to appoint the defense lawyer immediately after the 
communication of the charge.303   For adult defendants, the amendment maintains the previous 
rule according to which the authorities have to inform the suspect that in case he should fail to 
retain a lawyer to act for him within three days of the communication of the charge and the 
authorities appoint a defense counsel ex officio if the defense is mandatory (section 132 para. 2).  
In addition, the law does not provide for adults the exact period of time within which the defense 
attorney has to be appointed.  Quite frequently, in practice the attorney is appointed just before 
the completion of the investigation. 
 
If defense is mandatory, the trial may not be held in the absence of the defense attorney.  
A violation of this provision results in the annulment of the verdict, unless the defendant is 
acquitted (CCP §250.II.d and §251.3). 
 
The Right to Be Informed of the Right to Defense and Exclusionary Rules 
 
The Hungarian CCP contains relatively strict rules governing the duty of the authorities 
to inform defendants of their right to counsel.  According to §132.2, after the communication of 
a charge based on a well founded suspicion, the suspect has to be informed of his right to retain a 
lawyer to represent him or to request for the appointment of a defense counsel.  Where 
mandatory defense is required, he is informed that if he fails to retain a lawyer within three days 
the authorities will appoint a defense counsel ex officio.  
 
In theory, the failure of the authorities to provide information on the right to defense counsel 
could lead to the exclusion of some evidence.  Section 60.3 of the CCP contains the general 
rule, according to which evidence obtained in violation of the CCP may not be used in the 
process.  Some decisions of the Hungarian Supreme Court tend to indicate that in practice the 
exclusion of evidence is restricted to those cases in which the law explicitly provides for the 
exclusion as a consequence of a violation of a specific provision, such as the exclusionary 
rule.  In reality, this is limited to a few specific circumstances. 
 
The first concerns the failure of the police, the prosecutor and the court to inform the 
defendant of his right to remain silent.  According to §87.2, before his interrogation the 
defendant has to be informed that he is not obliged to make any statement and that he may 
exercise the right to remain silent at any stage of the procedure.  If the authorities fail to provide 
that information, the defendant‟s statement may not be used as evidence.     
 
Section 60.2 of the CCP contains the general prohibition of using force, menace, 
intimidation or similar methods in order to obtain confession, without explicitly determining 
their consequences. Some court decisions suggest that a violation of §60.2 results in the 
exclusion of the confession.  
 
Evidence also has to be excluded if the proceeding authorities disregard the rule on 
persons who may not be heard as witnesses.  Section 65 of the CCP provides that the defense 
counsel may not be heard as a witness concerning facts he learned of in the course of performing 
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his duties as defense counsel. Nor are individuals who are unable to make reliable testimony 
because of mental or physical deficiencies allowed to act as witnesses.  Finally, individuals 
bearing state or official secrets who have not been relieved of their obligation of secrecy may not 
be heard as witnesses.  Testimony may not be used if the witness has not been informed of his 
privilege.  This is the case when the duty to testify would violate the privilege against self-
incrimination.  Individuals bound by professional secrecy also have the right to refuse to testify.  
In all these cases it is up to the potential witness to exercise the privilege.  What invalidates the 
testimony is the authority‟s failure to provide the necessary information on the right not to 
testify. 
 
In summary, despite the small number of judgments making reference to the general rule 
on illegally obtained evidence (§60.3 of the CCP),304 decisions of the Supreme Court indicate 
that the general practice is inclined to limit the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence to 
instances explicitly referred to in the CCP. Accordingly, the failure of the authorities to inform 
the defendant of his right to counsel is not likely to result in the exclusion of something like a 
statement made by the defendant.    
 
Representation in the Procedure Following the Final Judgment  
 
Ex officio appointment authorizes the defense counsel to represent the defendant until the 
final court decision has been passed.  Accordingly, his representation does not extend to retrial or 
revision, both being extraordinary remedies of final court judgments.  If the conditions which 
make defense mandatory still exist, such as when the convicted person is deprived of his liberty 
or is mentally handicapped, the authorities have the duty to appoint a new defense counsel. 
 
It follows from all the above provisions that ex officio appointment does not extend to the 
preparation and submission of complaints to international human rights bodies and 
representation before them.  
 
The rules governing ex officio appointment apply to lawyers on retainer. They are entitled 
to act on behalf of their client until the final court judgment has been delivered, unless the  
defendant and the lawyer agree otherwise.     
   
 
III. LEGAL RULES, ACCESS TO COURTS, THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT 
 
Access to Courts According to the Constitution 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary provides that everyone is entitled to bring 
his/her case before a court. The right to counsel is listed among the minimum guarantees to 
which defendants are entitled.  
 
                                                          
304  See, for instance, the decision according to which the statement of an illiterate suspect may not be used if two 
so called official witnesses have failed to be present at the interrogation as prescribed by the law (FBK 1995/9) or 
according to which the statements of the defendant made during the psychological examination may not be used (JD 
1995/449). 
However, there are a few omissions in Hungarian legislation which weaken the express 
constitutional principle granting the right to access to the courts.  First, although the Constitution 
on a general level declares that claims originating from violations of basic rights are to be 
enforced before the courts (§70/K), these claims are normally rejected unless they invoke an 
explicit provision in the implementing legislation.  Furthermore, even if as a general rule 
administrative decisions can be challenged before the courts, there are still some exceptions. 
 
Mandatory Defense 
 
According to the CCP, legal assistance in criminal cases is mandatory if: 
(1) the defendant is detained (with the exception of arrest which may last, as indicated above, for 
a period of maximum 72 hours);  
(2) if he/she is blind, mute, deaf or otherwise physically or mentally handicapped;  
(3) if the defendant does not understand Hungarian;  
(4) if he/she is suspected of having committed a criminal offense for which a prison sentence 
exceeding five years may be imposed;  
(5) the defendant is a juvenile;305   
(6) if proceedings take place in the absence of the defendant; or  
(7) in the event of a special procedure used primarily for flagrancy offenses in which simpler 
rules may be applied for investigation and indictment.  
In addition, the proceeding authority may appoint a defense lawyer if requested by the defendant, 
provided that the request is deemed justified by the proceeding authority.  
 
Responsibility for the provision of legal aid is shared by the authority acting in the given 
phase of the procedure and the attorneys.  Accordingly, it is the task of the police, the prosecutor 
or the court to rule on the appointment, whereas it is the responsibility of the lawyers‟ chambers 
to ensure that their members be available for appointment.  In theory any member of the Bar may 
be appointed ex officio.  In practice, many lawyers try to avoid appointment.  This was especially 
true before the elimination of the numerus clausus in 1991 among those who acted as legal 
advisors at state owned companies or in the local government and therefore lacked any 
experience in criminal cases.  The lawyers‟ chambers collect the names of those advocates who 
are willing to act upon appointment and forward the list to the courts, the prosecution agencies 
and the police.  However, it is important to emphasize that the law does not distinguish between 
lawyers who are willing to take criminal cases on appointment and those who are not.  
According to the relevant legislation, all attorneys have the duty to perform the tasks related to 
the appointment.306  
 
According to the Law on the Bar, defense lawyers appointed ex officio are private 
attorneys paid on a case by case basis.  Under Hungarian criminal procedural law, appointment 
of lawyers ex officio is not limited to indigent defendants. Any defendant who is not able or 
willing to retain a lawyer is provided with an appointed lawyer if defense is mandatory.  
 
Officially appointed lawyers are entitled to be reimbursed for the first hour of the trial or 
any other procedural act, including those in the investigation phase of the process, by 1000 HUF 
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(approximately $5) and by 500 HUF for subsequent hours.  Officially appointed attorneys are not 
paid for the time they communicate with their clients, even if the defendant is in detention.  Only 
travel and accommodation expenses are reimbursed.  
 
Indigent Defendants, Victims and Witnesses : ex officio Appointed Defense Counsel  
 
Ex officio appointment is not related to the financial resources of the defendant.   In 
contrast to the Code of Civil Procedure, the term indigence is not mentioned in the CCP.  
Individuals in civil cases, who for lack of financial resources are unable to cover the expenses of 
the process, are entitled to certain privileges.  Thus, they are not obliged to pay court fees, they 
are relieved from paying costs arising in the process, such as witness or expert fees, the fee for 
interpretation, etc., they may be exempted from providing assurance, and they are entitled to the 
appointment of an attorney acting on their behalf as a free protector.  Parties to a civil suit are 
entitled to these benefits if their income does not exceed the current minimum amount of old-age 
pension and if they do not possess any property except the normal essentials of life.  This 
provision will also apply to defendants in the criminal process following the entry into force of 
the new CCP.  
 
In addition to the privileges linked to indigence, there are certain types of civil cases in 
which the parties are exempt from paying the costs of the suit irrespective of their financial 
conditions. These include paternity actions, cases for the discontinuation or restoration of 
parental supervision, child maintenance actions, cases related to custody and the majority of the 
suits arising from labor contracts.  
 
On the other hand, in criminal cases ex officio appointment is linked to the defendant‟s 
inability or unwillingness to retain a lawyer to act for him.  Sociologically it is mostly the poor 
defendants who lack the capacity of retaining a lawyer for the simple reason that they do not 
have acquaintance with this strata of the population.  Nevertheless, irrespective of his financial 
resources, the defendant faced with a mandatory defense is provided with an officially appointed 
attorney if he fails to retain a lawyer to act for him.  The rationale underlying this approach 
seems to be clear.  If legislation prescribes the obligatory participation of the defense attorney, 
the defendant has no choice.  He may not waive his “right” to a defense counsel.  It would be 
unacceptable to force him to retain a lawyer.  Thus, it is not the indigence of the defendant that 
justifies the ex officio appointment but the interests of justice.  
 
Interests of justice also explain the possibility of appointing an attorney in cases other 
than those involving a mandatory defense. In these cases the defendant may request the 
appointment of a lawyer but the proceeding authority is not bound by the request.  It will appoint 
a lawyer only if it considers the request to be justified.  In practice defendants rarely make use of 
this opportunity.  However, appointment is generally granted when requested.  It should be 
added that the police, the prosecutor or the court may also appoint ex officio and without the 
defendant‟s request, a defense lawyer if they regard it necessary, even in cases which fall outside 
the scope of the mandatory defense.  
 
According to court practice, the authorities should appoint a lawyer in cases outside the 
scope of the mandatory defense if the case is complicated, evidentiary problems arise, or if the 
defendant has difficulties in defending himself effectively in person, such as when defendant 
serves his military term.307   If the police, the prosecutor or the first instance court should make 
an erroneous evaluation and fail to appoint a lawyer when the interests of the defendant so 
require, the second instance court will annul the decision and remand the case to the first 
instance court.  Although in practice the provisions on appointment outside the cases of 
mandatory defense are rarely invoked, appointment is seldom denied when requested.      
 
In sum, the interests of justice, not the defendants‟ lack of financial means, explain the 
institution of the ex officio appointment.  The defendant‟s financial conditions, however, may 
count in certain cases.  According to §219 of the CCP, on the request of the appointed defense 
lawyer the court may oblige the defendant to pay the lawyer as if he had given the lawyer a 
mandate.  In such cases, this payment replaces the fee to be paid by the court to the defense 
counsel.  In judicial practice,308 the defendant‟s financial conditions are taken into account 
when the court decides on the defense lawyer‟s request.  The other decisive criterion is the 
attorney‟s performance.  For instance, if the trial lasts for a long period of time, the attorney 
attends and is sufficiently active, he may be awarded the requested sum.  Judicial practice in this 
respect reveals the somewhat cynical approach or assumption of the legislation according to 
which ex officio appointed attorneys are normally rather passive, justifying the low fees.  If they 
proceed contrary to this negative expectation, the defendant may be forced to pay for the 
attorney‟s unusual performance.  
 
It is also worth mentioning that the CCP contains a provision frequently criticized by 
defense attorneys according to which §219 does not apply to acquittals.  The rationale of this 
provision is that innocent defendants should not be ordered to pay if defense is mandatory.  In 
other words, they have no option to not be represented.  On the other hand, the criticism is 
justified in that it deprives defense lawyers of requesting a higher fee in cases where they have 
performed an excellent job.                                     
 
To make it abundantly clear, ex officio appointment does not mean that the defendant is 
relieved from paying the fees of the appointed attorney.  It simply means that  payment will be 
postponed. The attorney receives his fee from the state.  If the verdict is guilty, the state will 
enforce its claim against the defendant, irrespective of the convicts‟ financial conditions.  Thus, 
the provisions of the present CCP are not completely in line with para. 3/c of Article 6 of the 
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  However, 
even under the Convention indigence alone does not justify free legal assistance.  There is 
justification only if “the interests of justice so require.”  
 
Even the provisions of the present CCP can be applied in such a manner that they is in 
compliance with the Strasbourg standards.  This holds at least for a certain group of cases.  
§217.3 authorizes the court to exempt the defendant found guilty from paying the costs of 
procedure, totally or in part, where the costs of the process are disproportionate to the gravity of 
the criminal offense.  In practice, the provision is used in relation to extremely expensive expert 
opinions necessary for a conviction of a relatively minor offense.  In theory, courts are 
empowered to relieve the convict from paying any costs, including the ex officio appointed 
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attorney‟s fee, on the ground that the individual lacks financial resources.  This is so, provided 
that the costs of the procedure are disproportionate to the criminal offense.  When comparing the 
costs of process with the offender‟s guilt, courts may consider the offender‟s financial 
conditions. 
 
The new CCP envisages significant changes for both mandatory defenses and the right to an 
officially appointed counsel.  Furthermore, it envisages free legal assistance depending on the 
defendant‟s indigence. First, it distinguishes between cases in which defense is mandatory 
throughout the whole procedure and those in which participation of a defense attorney is 
obligatory only during the trial.  The first group comprises the following cases:  
 
(1) the defendant is detained ( with the exception of arrest )309;  
(2) the defendant is deaf, blind, mute or mentally ill, or for some other reasons is hindered 
from defending himself personally; or 
(3) the defendant does not speak Hungarian or the language of the procedure (according to 
the draft Code the language of a national minority can also be the official language of the 
procedure provided that special legislation lays down the detailed criteria).  Defense 
should be mandatory during the whole process when the defendant is proceeded against 
in absentia.  
 
In court procedure, the defense lawyer‟s participation is obligatory in cases which come before 
the county court as the first instance court.  These are the more serious cases.  According to the 
Penal Code, in cases of criminal offenses for which the Code provides a penalty of five years or 
more imprisonment, the Code also requires a defense lawyer‟s obligatory participation. 
 
The defense lawyer‟s participation in court procedure is also mandatory if the subsidiary 
private accuser initiates the court proceeding.  If the prosecutor discontinues the investigation 
and refrains from bringing the case before the court, the victim may request a continuation of 
the procedure.  If the court grants leave to prosecute the victim, a subsidiary private accuser 
may perform the functions of the public prosecutor.  However, the subsidiary private accuser 
has to be represented by an attorney.  In order to guarantee the equality of arms, the new 
Code makes defense in this case mandatory.  
 
Differences in wealth and social power result in varying potential to enforce one‟s claims.  
The new CCP is likely to widen the gap.  For instance, it envisages the participation of an 
attorney who could be present at the interrogation of the witness (also during the investigation) 
and who could assist the witness primarily in making use of his privilege not to testify.  
However, indigent witnesses will hardly be able to make use of this type of assistance as no ex 
officio appointment is envisaged for those who lack the necessary resources for obtaining a 
lawyer of their choice.  
 
Indigent victims will face more serious difficulties when wishing to act as subsidiary 
private accusers.  According to the new Code, the participation of an attorney on behalf of the 
victim is mandatory in case of subsidiary private accusation.  The appointment of an attorney is 
                                                          
309 See above under II. 
not granted for those who cannot afford to pay for the services of the legally skilled expert.  Thus 
the new Code, which in principle considerably broadens the rights of the participants in the 
process, is likely to create differences in the potential to access the justice system to an extent 
which is hardly tolerable in a society governed by the rule of law.  
 
For cases arising out of a mandatory defense envisaged in the new Code, the defense 
counsel‟s participation during the whole procedure is also obligatory in  
(1) proceedings directed against juveniles,  
(2) cases when the accused is proceeded against according to the rules of simplified 
investigation (primarily in case of flagrant offenses), and  
(3)  if, for the defendant‟s pleading guilty, the court imposes sentence outside the trial.  
 
According to the new Code, the proceeding authorities also have a duty to appoint a 
defense lawyer ex officio if the defendant is not in a position to retain a lawyer of his own choice 
for lack of financial resources.  The envisaged modification is extremely significant because the 
fees of the ex officio appointed attorney, in contrast to the present regulation are paid under 
indigence by the state irrespective of the outcome of the procedure.  
 
As indicated above, it is private lawyers who perform the duties of ex officio appointed 
lawyers.  For the last few years, law clinics have also provided legal assistance to certain groups 
of criminal defendants.  For example, within the framework of the clinic set up in Budapest in 
1997, such cases have been selected which are likely to disclose deficiencies in legislation or in 
practice and their clients are mostly indigent defendants.  The work is done by private lawyers 
who are paid by the program.  The project has also an educational component.  The students 
whose work is recompensed by a fellowship are assigned to an individual lawyer.  The idea is 
that the students should also take part in the proceedings in addition to discussing the cases with 
the lawyer.  However, the relevant legal provisions limit their participation to presence at the 
discussion between the lawyer and the client if the latter is at liberty.  The legal problems related 
to the individual cases are then analyzed by the students under the guidance and with the 
assistance of university professors.  
 
 
IV. THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE SYSTEM OF OFFICIAL APPOINTMENT IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT 
STUDIES 
 
The Report of the Parliamentary Ombudsman 
 
Even if comprehensive studies on the operation of the system of ex officio appointed 
attorneys have not yet been done, everyday experience as well as research on a relatively low 
number of criminal defendants clearly shows the serious deficiencies of the system.  I confine 
myself to two recent sources referred to above.  The first is the examination of the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman (National Assembly Commissioner for Civil Rights) carried out in 1996.  The 
second is the jail monitoring program of the Constitutional and Legislative Policy Institute 
(COLPI) and the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, also conducted in 1996.  
 
The report of the Ombudsman‟s Office was partly based on a 1996 inquiry carried out by 
the National Prison Administration.  This inquiry comprised almost 1000 detained individuals 
who were asked to report on their experience with their defense counsels.  Of these, 67.7 per cent 
had ex officio attorneys.  When questioned whether the detainees were satisfied with their 
defense counsels‟ performance, 21.6 per cent expressed extreme dissatisfaction, while 15.8 per 
cent reported that they were simply not satisfied with their attorneys‟ performance.  The 
detainees also responded to the question whether they had sufficient contact with their lawyers.  
233 individuals were of the opinion that the number of meetings with the lawyer was 
satisfactory, 52 blamed the police for the low number of meetings with their lawyers, while 322 
blamed the attorney. 
 
The statements of the detainees were corroborated by interviews of staff members at the 
Budapest Prison.  They reported that, with few exceptions, defense lawyers do not make any 
requests to the prison administration.  It is primarily the detainees themselves who make attempts 
to contact their lawyers.  
 
The report of the Ombudsman identified a number of reasons for the ex officio appointed 
lawyers' poor performance.  The first concerned the lack of adequate legal provisions motivating 
appointed counsel to do their best in the interest of their clients.  The decree of  the Minister of 
Justice No.1/1974 (II.15) IM on the fee and expenses of the ex officio appointed defense attorney 
in criminal proceedings does not provide for compensation for maintaining contact with the 
clients unless the attorney has to travel to a place outside the seat of his office.  
 
The report of the Ombudsman correctly criticizes the present regulation as clearly 
contrary to Hungary‟s obligations under international law, because it does not exempt indigent 
defendants from paying the attorney‟s fees while only providing for advance payments by the 
state.  
 
Improper rules in the CCP are also responsible for the appointed attorneys‟ poor 
performance.  As pointed out in the Ombudsman‟s report, the CCP provides only for the right of 
the defense counsel at certain procedural acts during investigation.  The lawyer‟s attendance is 
not required.  This regulation also refers to the hearing at which decision on pretrial detention is 
taken (with the noted exception of juvenile cases).  Accordingly, the arrested individual can be 
placed in pretrial detention and be thereby deprived of his liberty for a relatively long period of 
time without having an opportunity to consult a person skilled in legal matters.  In the 
Ombudsman‟s view, this violates the rule of law principle as well as each individual‟s right to 
defense.  
 
According to the findings of the report, the lack of precise provisions for the time of 
appointment and the vague rules on the defense counsel‟s access to the files are likely to curtail 
the defendants‟ right to effective defense. 
 
Finally, the report raises the question of the lack of effective control over the activity of 
the appointed counsel. Disciplinary procedure seems to be rather ineffective simply because of 
the low number of complaints.  In 1996, there were two cases in Budapest in which the reckless 
performance of appointed lawyers was at issue, both cases directed against the same attorney. 
The relatively mild disciplinary sanctions imposed also account in part for the problem of ex 
officio performance.  The Minister of Justice does not have effective means to enforce proper 
performance.  His supervisory powers extend solely to verify decisions taken by certain bodies 
of the Bar on their formal legality.  In addition, the minimal requirements that appointed defense 
counsel should meet have not been determined. 
 
The Findings of the 1996 Jail Monitoring Project 
 
The conclusions drawn  from the jail monitoring program of COLPI and the Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee were similar to the findings of the Ombudsman‟s report.  The monitoring 
program involved over 400 suspects held in pretrial detention. Almost 60 per cent of those who 
responded to the questionnaire had ex officio appointed defense counsel.  
 
The difference between the performance of the lawyers on retainer and that of the ex 
officio appointed attorneys was clearly indicated by the detainees‟ replies concerning their 
contact with the lawyers.  According to the replies, almost 20 per cent of all the detainees could 
make contact with their lawyers immediately after their detention and almost 90 per cent of these 
“fortunate” suspects had lawyers on retainer.  More than 30 per cent of those who had lawyers on 
retainer could make contact with them immediately, whereas only 5.2 per cent of those who had 
ex officio lawyers could make such contact.  23.7 per cent of the respondents stated that they had 
not met their lawyer yet (at the time of the inquiry), and almost 81 per cent of those had ex 
officio appointed defense counsels.  Within the group of defendants with appointed defense 
counsel, the ratio of those who had no contact with their lawyers at the time of the inquiry came 
up to 43.7 per cent, whereas the ratio for defendants with lawyers on retainer amounted to only 
8.1 per cent.  
 
The jail monitoring project revealed several kinds of deficiencies related to the system of 
ex officio appointed defense attorneys.  Thus, suspects with appointed attorneys are practically 
left without the support of a legal expert when they are informed of the charges based on a well 
founded suspicion. Many of the suspects are simply not informed of the possibility of the 
appointed counsel. Foreigners are hindered in contacting the appointed counsel due to the police‟ 
failure to provide an interpreter.  Several suspects complained that the ex officio appointed 
attorneys tried to receive a retainer from them.  Lawyers sometimes make a hint that in exchange 
of a fee they could use their police contacts to have the detainee released.  Sometimes they 
simply indicate that they are determined to act only if the detainee pays. 
 
The Ombudsman’s Recommendations 
 
As their findings were similar, it is not surprising that both the Ombudsman and the 
experts involved in the jail monitoring program formulated similar recommendations for 
improving the system of ex officio appointed defense counsel.  Both reports propose to rethink 
the whole institution, including its financial aspects.  They suggest considering the possibility of 
introducing new institutions such as the public defender‟s office or specialist defense counsel in 
criminal cases. 
 
The report of the Ombudsman also contains recommendations concerning the amendment 
of a number of existing laws.  It proposes to formulate precise provisions for the CCP on the 
time limit within which the police are obliged to appoint counsel in cases of mandatory defense.  
They also propose to make the presence of the defense counsel at the court hearing that decides 
upon pretrial detention obligatory.  It urges the modification of the CCP in order to reduce the 
discretionary powers of the police in notifying the defense counsel of the procedural acts and to 
guarantee for the counsel easier and wider access to case files than that ensured at present under 
the law.  The report urges the Minister of Justice to prepare legislation exempting indigent 
defendants from paying the costs of the procedure, determine the precise standards for the 
performance of appointed defense counsels and to elaborate effective rules providing for 
appropriate sanctions in case appointed counsels fail to perform their tasks responsibly.  
 
The recommendations addressed to the President of the National Chamber of Advocates 
provide for the education of the advocate trainees in ethical issues and the supplementation of the 
existing code of conduct for advocates, with a view to improving the efficiency of the appointed 
defense lawyers‟ activity.  
 
Some of the recommendations of the Ombudsman were similar to the approach taken by 
the committee which drafted the new CCP.  For example, the new Code provides that for 
mandatory defenses, the police and the prosecutor are obliged to appoint the defense counsel 
immediately if the suspect declares that he does not wish to assign a lawyer.  On the other hand, 
the new Code prohibits the present practice, which allows them to appoint simply a lawyer‟s 
office without specifying an individual attorney to represent the defendant.  It also obliges the 
defense counsel to contact the suspect immediately after the appointment and to inform the 
authorities of the person authorized to substitute him.  The rules on the defense counsel‟s access 
to the files of the investigation are formulated more precisely in the new Code than in the present 
CCP.  As referred to earlier, the exemption of the indigent defendant from bearing the costs of 
the process is also envisaged.  
 
The Reaction of the Bar  
 
In this context it is worth reflecting on the reaction of the Budapest Chamber of 
Attorneys on the recommendations.310  In a letter addressed to the Ombudsman, the president of 
the Chamber welcomed most of the recommendations, such as the prohibition of appointing 
lawyer‟s offices without specifying the individual attorney, the recognition of the defendant‟s 
right to refuse the individual lawyer appointed by the authorities, the increase of the fees for the 
appointed attorneys, and the exemption of indigent defendants from bearing the costs of the 
process.  
 
The president expressed his disagreement with the recommendation calling on the 
Minister of Justice to prepare legislation setting the minimum standards for the performance of 
appointed lawyers as legal requirement.  In his view, this would only result in formal 
requirements unlikely to bring about any improvement in substance.  He also voiced his strong 
opposition to the proposal that state control be imposed over the performance of ex officio 
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appointed attorneys and expressed his conviction that the only body suitable for control and 
supervision while respecting the independence of the profession is the Chamber of Attorneys.  
 
The president also expressed his doubts about setting up a state financed legal aid service.  
Referring to cultural and legal traditions, he was of the opinion that Hungarian society would 
never trust such an institution.  Criminal defendants would never consider public defenders as 
their benefactors.  Rather, they would regard them as state “spies.”  Instead of making “doubtful 
attempts” to introduce a legal aid service, he proposed to set up the list of “attorneys acting in 
criminal cases” on the basis of German and Austrian examples.  The list would include those 
attorneys who are willing to take criminal cases on appointment.  Only the attorneys included in 
this list could receive authorization to act as lawyers on retainer in criminal cases. 
 
It is difficult to decide whether Hungarian society would actually reject the idea of the 
legal aid service.  Under the present conditions, setting up a state financed legal aid system in the 
near future seems to be unlikely.  The opposition of attorneys is too strong and the Government 
does not seem to be determined to bring about radical changes.  One may only hope that the new 
Rules of Conduct of the Attorneys‟ Profession adopted by the Bar Association setting higher 
ethical standards, and the new Law on the Bar likely to be adopted by Parliament in 1998 
prescribing higher professional and ethical requirements for attorneys and attorney-trainees, will 
result in the improvement of the situation for those who are unable to retain an attorney of their 
choice because of the lack of financial resources or other reasons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
